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of the dissent before joining the majority opinion. And it is nearly 
criminal to change one's mind, particularly after one has already 
cast one's vote, and particularly if one has voted with a five member 
majority. Operating together, the Court's informal "rules" protect 
Justices from having to persuade or resist persuasion, from having 
to closely scrutinize each other's work, and from having to address 
or correct deficiencies in their opinions. 
This is a relatively new phenomenon. Rehnquist's own ac-
count of the 1951 Term and discussions I have had with former law 
clerks suggest that the sterile environment in which the Justices 
now function contrasts sharply with the relatively collegial atmos-
phere in which at least the Vinson and Warren Courts worked. 
Perhaps the Chief Justice is so accustomed to the present conditions 
that they no longer trouble him. Perhaps he believes that the situa-
tion is not as bleak as I portray. Or perhaps he feels that the 
Court's workload requires Justices to make up their minds quickly, 
stick with their decisions, forego trying to persuade their colleagues, 
and sometimes accept unsatisfactory work. Rehnquist's unusual 
defense of the Court's insipid conferences suggests that the lack of 
"interplay" among his colleagues-and what that might reflect-
concern him, but his full views remain unknown. 
The Supreme Court is a worthwhile book, full of pleasant and 
interesting anecdotes about the Court and the Chief Justice who 
now leads it. But it could have been much more. One is left wish-
ing that Rehnquist had not attempted to write three books at once, 
but had instead devoted his considerable gifts to a serious examina-
tion of the way in which the present Court goes about its business. 
SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE. By 
Kent Greenawalt.' New York and Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press. 1989. Pp. viii, 349. $45.00. 
Maimon Schwarzschild 2 
The power of speech is an essential part of what makes us 
human: it is the basis of politics and of civilization itself.3 Through 
speech, people join together to hunt for food, build houses, farm the 
I. Cardozo Professor of Jurisprudence, Columbia University. 
2. Professor of Law, University of San Diego; barrister of Lincoln's Inn, London. 
Thanks for their advice on the first draft to Professors Larry Alexander and Michael Perry. 
3. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, Book I, sections 9·11, pp. 9·11 (Loeb Classical Library 1944 
ed.) 
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land; through speech they can express love, create poetry, and bring 
out the best in one another. And as Vaclav Havel wrote a month or 
two before the wondrous collapse of European communism, "a 
writer's congress or some speech at it is capable of shaking the en-
tire structure of government. "4 
But alongside its miraculous power for good, speech also has 
an immense capacity for evil. In personal relations, hard words in-
flict real pain, and how can you really "take back" a sharp word 
once it has been spoken? Through speech, we insult each other, 
betray each other, threaten each other. Political speech can prom-
ise utopia, and deliver genocide. As Havel puts it, words of freedom 
and truth are matched by words that inflame and deceive-and 
sometimes these words of good and evil are the very same words, 
"even both at once. "s 
One of the most unsettling things about words is that they dif-
ferentiate people as well as join them together. Only in words can 
you express likes, dislikes, principles, values that are individual, 
that are yours and not mine.6 "You say tomayto, I say tomahto; 
You say potayto, I say potahto." Real freedom of speech, accord-
ingly, features only in those societies-historically rare-that value 
individuality and personal independence: liberal societies, in short. 
Given the propensity of speech for evil as well as good, such free-
dom of speech undoubtedly carries great dangers. 
Professor Kent Greenawalt's scrupulous new book explores 
whether there are types of communication that can properly be for-
bidden even in a society that believes in free speech. Professor 
Greenawalt focuses on the philosophical and constitutional status of 
communications that have traditionally been criminal in America: 
solicitation of crime, fraud, and "offensive" communications like 
pornography. The tendency of the book is to support the broad 
thrust of American criminal law in these areas, by arguing-fairly 
persuasively, it seems to me-that such forbidden communications 
are different in kind from the sorts of speech that ought to be free. 
I 
Greenawalt begins by suggesting that if you believe in free 
speech, you probably do so for a variety of reasons and not for one 
reason alone. You may think free speech promotes good conse-
4. Havel, Words on Words, New York Review of Books, Jan. 18, 1990, at 5. 
5. /d., pp. 5-6. 
6. See G. STEINER, AFTER BABEL: AsPECTS OF LANGUAGE AND TRANSLATION 56 
(1975) ("languages have been, thoughout human history, zones of silence to other men and 
razor-edges of division"). 
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quences: that it is conducive to discovering truths (or at least more 
conducive than government suppression of discussion); that it facili-
tates discovery of what people want, so that their interests can per-
haps be accommodated and social frustration forestalled; that it 
enables people to expose abuses of authority; that it gives people an 
emotional outlet and promotes learning and personal development. 
You may also think that free speech is good in itself, essential to 
personal autonomy or personal dignity. 1 
Considering the immense range of things that people can com-
municate to one another, Greenawalt is surely right that you are 
unlikely to have only one reason for permissiveness towards all the 
different things that people might say or write. Greenawalt's point 
is that the various justifications for free speech overlap only in part 
with general libertarian principles; many of the justifications-or 
many combinations of them-really apply only to communication. 
Accordingly, the scope of free speech ought to correspond to the 
reasons people have for supporting free speech. 
The next step in Greenawalt's argument is the crucial one in 
the book. Some communications, he says, make assertions-or 
carry on a discussion-about facts or values. This is self-expres-
sion, and it is squarely covered by the justifications for free speech. 
Freedom to say "China tested a nuclear bomb yesterday" is condu-
cive to discovering the truth of the matter; so likewise is freedom to 
say "Your wife has a lover." "I want to earn five dollars an hour" 
facilitates meeting my desire. "I'm angry" gives me an emotional 
outlet and affords me the dignity of self-expression. "Nixon vio-
lated the election laws" exposes an abuse of authority. And so 
forth. The justifications for free speech cover communication about 
private as well as public matters, since people obviously care deeply 
about private matters and since our understanding of personal mat-
ters affects our views about matters of general concern. 
There is another kind of communication, however, which is 
not primarily an assertion of fact or of value, but which Greenawalt 
calls "situation-altering." Utterances like "I bid three hearts" or "I 
promise to deliver three tons at one hundred dollars a ton" or 
"Let's mug that guy and divide whatever we find in his wallet" or 
"Your money or your life" work direct changes in the social con-
text. Such utterances are primarily ways of doing, not of asserting. 
According to Greenawalt, they are not covered by the justifications 
7. Cj Epstein, The Utilitarian Foundations of Natural Law, 12 HARV. J. LAW & PuB-
LIC POLICY 713 (1989) and Wonnell, Four Challenges Facing a Compatibilist Philosophy, 12 
HARV. J. LAW & PUBLIC POLICY 835 (1989) (suggesting that consequentialist and goad-in-
themselves "natural rights" considerations do not conftict as much as most philosophers have 
tended to assume). 
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for free speech, or at least not nearly to the same degree that asser-
tions are, and hence the free speech principle should not protect 
them. And, in fact, it is communication of this sort that is regulated 
by American contract law and forbidden by the laws against threats 
and solicitations to commit crime. 
Greenawalt's distinction is inspired by the philosopher J. L. 
Austin's concept of "performative" utterances.s It also resembles 
the rough-and-ready line between "speech" and "action" which the 
courts sometimes rely on in close free speech cases. 9 Greenawalt 
acknowledges that the boundary between expressive and situation-
altering communication will often be fuzzy, but he says that the 
distinction still offers a reasonable guide for regulating communica-
tion in a society committed to free speech. 
Judged by Greenawalt's distinction, a lot of ordinary commu-
nication is troublingly ambiguous. When I say "China tested a nu-
clear bomb yesterday," I may radically change your view of China, 
of me, of whether it is worth your while reading law reviews now 
that the end is nigh. When I say "Your wife has a lover," my asser-
tion might be situation-altering in even more obvious ways. And 
just as assertions can be situation-altering, so a classically situation-
altering communication like "Your money or your life," when spo-
ken by Robin Hood perhaps, can express a uniquely memorable 
homily about social justice and the fair distribution of wealth.1o 
And yet, while Greenawalt's distinction-like so many theo-
ries-has a way of dissolving if you look at it too hard, it also has 
strong common-sense appeal. Like the hoary speech-action distinc-
tion, it goes some distance towards explaining why no one seriously 
suggests that "Give me your wallet or I will kill you" is protected 
by the first amendment. In a great many cases, weighing whether a 
communication is more nearly "expressive" or more nearly "situa-
tion-altering" is as good a way as any to think about whether it may 
properly be suppressed. 
II 
Weighing a great many such cases fills up the bulk of Speech, 
Crime, and the Uses of Language. Greenawalt painstakingly as-
sesses countless hypothetical threats, offers, encouragements, solici-
8. See Austin, Performative Utterances, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 233 (J. Urmson & 
G. Warnock eds. 3rd ed. 1979). 
9. See, e.g., U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (burning a draft card is "con-
duct" and may therefore be punished as a crime). 
10. As Greenawalt points out, Austin himself in later life grew doubtful of his concept 
of "performative" speech, precisely because so many messages are equivocal in this way. See 
J. AUSTIN, How To Do THINGS WITH WORDS (2d ed. 1975). 
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tations, and fraudulent representations. He recognizes that 
ordinary communications are often both expressive and situation-
altering. The typical threat, for example, asserts a fact ("unless you 
do X, I will do Y"); it may also involve an outpouring of emotion, 
and freedom of speech is often justified in part as an outlet for emo-
tion. But when someone threatens you, the social situation changes 
in the very basic sense that you may be terrorized into doing some-
thing that you do not want to do, just as if physical force had been 
used against you. Free speech should not be a licence for people to 
terrorize one another. With communications that are both expres-
sive and situation-altering, Greenawalt's approach is to balance ex-
pressive value against undesirable social consequences. In the case 
of a threat, what is the listener being asked to do? How harmful are 
the threatened consequences? Is the threat solely a form of pres-
sure, or does it also convey information about what would happen 
even if no threat had been made? 
By contrast with this "balancing" approach, the Supreme 
Court sometimes claims that it will strike down virtually any re-
striction on speech (by "strictly scrutinizing" the restriction). II The 
strict scrutiny standard is actually applied, for the most part, in 
cases involving more or less "political" speech. By announcing that 
freedom of speech is virtually absolute, the court emphasizes the 
importance of this freedom and eschews balancing it against other 
concerns. The implicit lesson is that free speech should not get 
short shrift when weighed against other values. But the Court's 
stated approach invites the question of whether threats, extortion, 
blackmail, and criminal solicitation are not also speech. And in 
other areas where the Justices are reluctant to strike down all re-
strictions, like commercial communication and especially pornogra-
phy, the Court's doctrine is notoriously tangled.12 
Greenawalt obviously does not consider the "ali-or-nothing" 
strict scrutiny standard to be intellectually serious. He scarcely 
mentions it in the book. "Your money or your life" is, after all, a 
speech, yet it is hard to imagine any society that would give it much 
11. See, e.g., Perry Education Assoc. v. Perry Local Educators' Assoc., 460 U.S. 37, 45 
(1983) (content-based regulation of speech in the public forum is impermissible unless "neces-
sary to serve a compelling state interest"); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Com-
mission, 447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980). 
12. On commercial speech, see e.g. Va. State Board of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Con-
sumer Council Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (Constitution protects advertisements of pharmaceu-
tical prices); but cf Posadas de Puerto Rico, Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 
U.S. 328 (1986) (Constitution does not protect advertisements for legal gambling). 
On pornography, see e.g. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 22 (1973) (conceding that "no 
majority of the Court has at any time been able to agree on a standard to determine what 
constitutes obscene, pornographic material subject to regulation"). 
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free-speech credit. Greenawalt relies, instead, on his case-by-case 
balancing approach, which really requires two sorts of balancing: 
first, to weigh whether a particular message is more expressive or 
more situation-altering, and then to weigh the worth of whatever 
expression the message contains against the social costs of allowing 
it to be communicated. 
Some such weighing is often inescapable. The rub, as with 
many balancing tests, is that you have to balance interests that are 
not really comparable: the expressive impact of a message against 
its situation-altering effects and then freedom of speech itself against 
various anti-social consequences. Apples and oranges (or apples 
and orangutans) at each juncture. 
This is the problem with Greenawalt's hypotheticals, which 
too often conclude with his arbitrary statement about which way he 
would decide, giving no real explanation of what his standards are 
for weighing the competing considerations. For instance, in his 
chapter on "encouragements to crime," Greenawalt argues that 
when I urge you to commit a crime, intending that you should 
promptly commit it, I ought to be liable to punishment, because my 
message is more situation-altering than expressive. But if you come 
to me for advice, and I disinterestedly recommend a crime, Greena-
walt says I should be exempt, because "sincere advice [is] important 
for personal deliberation." Why does the social value of advice out-
weigh the social cost of the encouragement to crime? If I do not 
explicity urge a crime, but tell you a fact, intending thereby to en-
courage a crime ("Your employee at the cement factory is a police 
informer") Greenawalt says I should be liable, but only "upon the 
most clear evidence" of my intent. Why should it not suffice to 
meet the conventional burden of proof in such a case? If I publish 
dangerous information-the recipe for a hydrogen bomb, say, or 
the identities of CIA agents in countries where they might be mur-
dered-Greenawalt would hold me liable, but only if I intend that a 
crime should be committed as a result of what I publish. Why is 
negligence about whether a crime will result not enough to make 
me liable? The problem is not that Greenawalt's conclusions are 
necessarily wrong, but that the scale on which he weighs the inter-
ests is unexplained. 
While Greenawalt's conclusions often invite this kind of ques-
tion, in most of the cases he considers-threats, offers, criminal 
encouragements, and so forth-the competing claims for free ex-
pression and for regulation are at least carefully set out. The hy-
potheticals are often intriguing, and Greenawalt's treatment is 
always clear, thoughtful, and thorough. 
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Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language is not, however, an 
easy book to read. This is partly a matter of organization. The 
book is in three parts: first, a theoretical overview of free speech in 
light of the distinction between expressive and situation-altering 
messages; then, several chapters on how legislatures might use the 
distinction to make laws against criminal communications; finally, 
chapters that assess the constitutionality of such laws. As the au-
thor disarmingly warns, this means that many points in the book 
are made three times. The author's penchant for drawing fine dis-
tinctions among hypothetical cases also demands a lot of patience in 
the reader.•J 
What makes this immensely sober book most difficult to read, 
however, is its very sobriety, its lack of passion and its distaste for 
controversy. The tone of the book implies that all reasonable peo-
ple surely value free speech very highly, as indeed the author clearly 
does. So Greenawalt concentrates on criminal scenarios that are 
not in any social or political sense very controversial. The book's 
treatment of truly controversial matters, by contrast, is curiously 
off-handed. 
"Group defamation," for instance, including racial insults-a 
volatile topic, at least on university campuses-gets six pages in the 
"legislative" section of the book and ten more in the "constitu-
tional" chapters. (Actually, both these treatments are considerably 
diluted by discussions of the much less controversial topic of ordi-
nary personal insults.) Greenawalt acknowledges that rough words 
are expressive, indeed that a general prohibition on racial slurs "is 
not to nibble at the edges of expression ... it is consciously to attack 
communications" because their ideas are abhorrent.I4 He points 
out how difficult it is to draw a line between abuse-if it is to be 
prohibited-and permissible discussion of the characteristics of 
groups or their members. He concludes equivocally that these is-
13. Greenawalt distinguishes "warning threats", for example, from "manipulative 
threats." A warning threat ("If you sell pornography I will inevitably be so angry at you that 
I may commit violence") conveys information and is arguably more nearly within the free 
speech principle than a manipulative threat ("I'll bum down your store unless you give me 
$1,000"), where the speaker would not dream of burning down the store except in the context 
of having made the threat. After analyzing many such threats, Greenawalt adds the rather 
charming postscript that his distinction should make no practical difference to the law: 
when, on balance, either type of threat is socially dangerous it should be suppressed. 
14. Greenawalt floats-without really analyzing-the suggestion that verbal abuse of a 
minority is more offensive than abuse of a secure majority (" 'honkey' hurts a lot less than 
'nigger'" (p.l47)). The implication is that a legal double standard might be appropriate. 
Greenawalt does not suggest who ought to decide which groups in a very pluralist society are 
secure and which are not, nor does he consider what the social implications might be of legal 
double standards depending on whether you identify yourself with a group which successfully 
casts itself as "disfavoured." 
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sues are "not easy"; there are weighty considerations of "equality 
and dignity" to support greater censorship, but Greenawalt's judg-
ment is that the law's present, generally permissive, approach is 
"about right." Pornography, another topic of sharp public contro-
versy, gets eleven pages in all, and here too the treatment is equivo-
cal as well as summary. Greenawalt concludes that pornography 
does involve expression, but that traditionalist and feminist advo-
cates of censorship also have valid concerns, and hence that the 
whole question "can reasonably be debated." 
III 
Greenawalt's approach assumes a stable consensus for 
freeedom of speech, at least for freedom of relatively serious "ex-
pressive" speech. When line-drawing problems arise in marginal 
cases, he implies, careful analysis should enable reasonable people 
to do the necessary balancing. But as Greenawalt himself suggests, 
no standards exist for this balancing except by reference to the justi-
fications for free speech. Hence, it is important to be explicit about 
what those justifications are and how they bear on the social costs 
and benefits of permissiveness or censorship for any particular class 
of messages. This is expecially true when you consider that people's 
support for free speech as a primary value cannot really be taken for 
granted. 
Throughout most of human history, after all, the idea that 
there should be broad freedom of expression whould have seemed 
perverse. In some cultures, it is not expression at all-free or other-
wise-that is most prized, but silence.1s It is certainly quite plausi-
ble to view heresy as an act of betrayal, corroding the communal 
ties that make it possible for people to live together. Speech does 
have grave power for evil. And really free speech is an especial 
threat, precisely because it is an instrument for non-conformity and 
individuality. 
There are plenty of arguments to support free speech, to be 
sure, although as Greenawalt suggests, no single argument is neces-
sarily very convincing on its own. Perhaps the whole battery of 
arguments is unlikely to persuade anyone who finds free speech 
temperamentally uncongenial. Firm support for free speech, in 
15. See 0. STEINER, LANGUAGE AND SILENCE 12-13 (1967) (the essentially verbal 
character of Western civilization is unusual and is not shared, e.g., by Buddhism or Taoism); 
cf S. Schwarzschild, Rav. L Butner, in CoNTEMPORARY JEWISH THINKERS (S. Katz ed.) 
(B'nai B'rith Pub. Co. Washington D.C.) (forthcoming 1991) ("Perhaps the single most fa-
mous doctrine of the Kotzker Rebbe is the virtue and practice of silence: what is not said and 
cannot be said is at least as important as what is put in words.") 
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fact, is usually associated with support for a bundle of other values, 
which can be summed up as the values of modernity or of the 
Enlightenment. 
These values include rationality, individualism, careers open to 
talent, considerable economic freedom, privacy, and the rights of 
citizens under law. There is a practical link between each of these 
values and freedom of expression. Rationality-unlike argument 
from authority-requires some freedom of discussion. Individual-
ism is largely a matter of what you are free to say. Careers can only 
be open to talent if you are free to communicate your talent. Eco-
nomic free markets require some freedom of commercial speech. 
Privacy is jeopardized in a society devoted to suppression of heresy. 
And legal rights imply some freedom of disputation, without which 
no right can be asserted. These Enlightenment values, with their 
links to free speech, also have practical links to the economic pros-
perity of modem life.t6 Free speech, from this point of view, is part 
and parcel of a uniquely successful material culture. 
The Enlightenment outlook has itself prospered of late, most 
dramatically in the transformation of eastern and central Europe. 
But it is important to remember that there are many other human 
outlooks, quite coherent in their own terms, that value free expres-
sion little or not at all. 
Among intellectuals, for example, there has never been a con-
sensus for the Enlightenment outlook. Historically, hostility to 
Enlightenment values has usually come from conservative or reac-
tionary thinkers, from Burke and Carlyle, Leontiev and de Maistre. 
There is little trace of that tradition in respectable intellectual cir-
cles nowadays, especially in America.11 In the American university 
world, on the other hand, rejection of the Enlightenment is a popu-
lar stance among radical and feminist academics,•s who often repu-
diate reason, individualism, careers based on merit, market 
economics, privacy, and the rule of law.l9 
16. See generally M. WEBER, THE PROTESfANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITAL· 
ISM (tr. T. Parsons 1958 ed.) on the links between rationalism, individualism, toleration, and 
the material wealth of modernity. 
17. There are echoes of the reactionary anti-Enlightenment tradition in the monthly 
Salisbury Review in England, and among the intellectuals around Mr. Russell Kirk in this 
country. The cognate slavophile tradition appears to be increasingly influential in the post-
glasnost USSR. 
18. Writing in the socialist journal Dissent, Professor David Bromwich describes as 
"dominant" this mood of "institutional radicalism," noting that "the prejudices of institu-
tional radicals tend to be antihumanist and anti-Enlightenment." Bromwich, The Future of 
Tradition, 36 DISSENT 541 (1989). 
19. For an example of feminist rejection of reason, see J. CocKS, THE OPPOSITIONAL 
IMAGINATION (1989). Writing in the left-wing journal New Politics, Janet Biehl condemns 
the feminist rejection of rationality, and speaks of a "counter-Enlightenment fog settling over 
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The intellectual source of this anti-Enlightenment stance run 
back to Marx's rejection of civil and political rights,zo and to Her-
bert Marcuse's more recent idea that tolerance is "repressive," and 
that a truly "liberating tolerance . . . would mean intolerance 
against movements from the Right and toleration of movements 
from the Left."zt There is now an active cottage industry in aca-
demic literature favoring punishment for speech deemed racist, sex-
ist, homophobic, or demeaning,22 in addition to the feminist 
literature calling for the suppression of pornography, not on the 
traditional ground that it isn't speech but on the ground that it 
propagates harmful ideas.zJ At the practical level, universities 
around the country are taking steps to restrict expression consid-
ered offensive. The University of Michigan, for example, adopted 
rules prohibiting any communication that "stigmatizes," giving as 
examples of forbidden speech, "A male student makes remarks in 
class like 'Women just aren't as good in this field as men,'" "Telling 
jokes about gay men and lesbians," or "Laughing at a joke about 
someone in your class who stutters." Because the University of 
Michigan is a state institution, these rules were struck down by the 
federal courts as violating the first amendment.24 But private uni-
versities are under no such constitutional constraint, and "speech 
codes" -some of them as sweeping as Michigan's-have been 
American academe." Biehl, On Feminism and the Retreat from Reason, 2 NEW PoLmcs 
180 (1990). 
20. Marx, On The Jewish Question, in K. MARx, EARLY WRITINGS 211 (1975 ed.) 
(rights are intrinsically linked to the egoism, competitiveness, and isolation of the bourgeois 
individual). Contemporary radicals seldom cite this source directly, perhaps out of embar-
rassment with Marx's claim that the prototype of the hateful bourgeois is the Jew. 
21. Marcuse, Repressive Tolerance, R WoLFF, B. MOORE, AND H. MARcusE, REPRES-
SIVE TOLERANCE 81, 122-23 (1969). Criticizing Marcuse generally, Professor Kolakowski 
suggests that "there could hardly be a clearer instance of the replacement of Marx's slogan 
'either socialism or barbarism' by the version 'socialism equals barbarism'." L. KoLAKOW-
SKI, 3 MAIN CURRENTS OF MARXISM 420 (1981). 
22. For a small sample, see Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist 
Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. (there should be strict regulation of speech that vilifies 
"subordinated" groups); Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action/or Racial Insults. Epi-
thets, and Name-Calling 17 HARV. Civ. RTS.-CIV. LIB. L. REv. 133 (1982); Arkes, Ci11ility 
and the Restriction of Speech: Rediscovering the Defamation of Groups, 1974 SuP. Cr. REv. 
281. See also Minow, "Looking Ahead to the 1990's: Constitutional Law and American 
Colleges and Universities" (key-note address to the National Association of Colleges' and 
Universities' Attorneys, June 1989) (suggesting, in words echoing Maccuse, that universities 
should have the "courage ... to be intolerant toward behavior that prevents anyone" from 
feeling comfortable in the university community). 
23. See, e.g., Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DuKE L.J. 589 
(1986); Mackinnon, Not a Moral Issue, 2 YALE L. & POLICY REv. 321 (1984); A. DWORKIN, 
PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN (1981). At its most extreme, this literature 
sometimes implies that all non-feminist speech is pornography, just as all heterosexual sex is 
rape. 
24. Doe v. Univ. of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989). 
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adopted at Yale, Stanford, Tufts, Emory, and elsewhere.2s These 
rules apply to faculty as well as to students, of course, which creates 
considerable pressure on scholars not to pursue "offensive" ideas.26 
If broad freedom of expression cannot be taken for granted on 
American university campuses, perhaps it cannot be taken for 
granted anywhere. Indeed, even the firmest believer in free speech 
cannot rest on a general rule that no communication should ever be 
suppressed. The lesson of Greenawalt's stubbornly intolerable 
threats, conspiracies, perjuries, false alarms, and frauds is that any 
society-however committed to free speech-must continually bal-
ance this freedom against the social dangers of evil or hurtful 
messages. And there is no science that tells you how much weight 
to attribute to either side of the scales in any particular case. 
Greenawalt's distinction between expressive and situation-altering 
speech, for example, is a helpful way to think about what messages 
should be free of censorship, but it can only be a very rough guide, 
given the enormous range of messages that are both expressive and 
situation-altering. 
Perhaps the most important thing is that whoever decides the 
cases should be genuinely committed to free speech as a matter of 
fundamental outlook. So long as someone like Kent Greenawalt is 
at the scales, there is no reason to fear that free speech will be bal-
anced lightly away; Greenawalt's earnest concern for free speech 
shines through in every case he considers. But for most of us, the 
reliability of our commitment to free speech probably depends to a 
great extent on the strength of our broader attachment to Enlight-
enment values. These values are the best guarantee that the inevita-
ble prohibitions of some kinds of communications will not be 
allowed to overwhelm free speech as a whole. Enlightenment val-
ues even provide a fairly specific framework for balancing free 
speech against competing concerns: in each case you would have to 
consider the costs, in terms of these values, of suppressing a particu-
lar kind of communication. It is always helpful to be explicit about 
these values, both because they do provide some standard for decid-
25. See Campus Debate Pits Freedom of Speech Against Ugly Words, N.Y. Times, Apr. 
25, 1989, at I (reporting on the steps taken by these universities "to restrict forms of expres-
sion deemed offensive"). See also Tufts: Students Protest Policy to Limit Speech Practices, 
N.Y. Times, September 17, 1989, at 61; Hentoff', An Unspeakable Crime at Yale, VILLAGE 
VOICE, July 15, 1986, at 33. 
26. In a report entitled Universities: Take Care, the London Economist gives such ex-
amples as the Tufts professor publicly charged with "racism and callousness" for recom-
mending "a standard work of urban anthropology . . . and raising some questions about 
affirmative action"; and "the country's leading demographer of race" at the University of 
Michigan, pressured into "abandoning a course on race relations." THE EcONOMIST 
(London), at 20, 23, February 10, 1990. 
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ing the hard cases and because they represent, after all, a controver-
sial commitment: one way of looking at the world, but by no means 
the only possible way. 
Greenawalt undoubtedly shares the Enlightenment values. In 
his restrained, judicious style, however, he shies away from saying 
why, and he does not bring these values explicitly to bear on his 
argument. His philosophical and legal close-order drill would be 
more interesting, and perhaps more persuasive, if he unbent a little 
and conveyed more fire about why free speech is important to him: 
why it matters for the sort of civilization he obviously believes in. 
INDIVIDUALS AND THEIR RIGHTS. By Tibor 
Machan.1 LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court Publishing Co. 1989. Pp. 
xviii, 250. $32.95, cloth; $16.95, paper. 
Michael Zuckert 2 
"The owl of Minerva," said Hegel, "flies only at dusk," by 
which he meant that only after an historical order is well-estab-
lished or even fading do the philosophers come to bring understand-
ing of it. Whether Hegel's utterance has such universal bearing as 
he believed is a nice question, but regarding the issue of rights there 
is much to be said for his assertion. We have had our "rights 
revolution," and now we are getting philosophy's attempts to bring 
some wisdom about rights. Since the mid-seventies or so many tal-
ented writers have philosophized about rights. To mention but a 
few-Robert Nozick, Ronald Dworkin, and Alan Gewirth have 
presented sophisticated theories of rights, all purporting to make 
sense of this concept so central to our political life, and each (of 
course) presenting doctrines quite different from the others. 
Tibor Machan is a frequent contributor to discussions about 
rights in the journals, and he published an earlier book on the sub-
ject in 1975. He has now drawn together his more recent work into 
another book. It could have been an important book, but its value 
is much diminished by various failings. To begin, it is not well-
tailored. Machan has stitched the book together from previously 
published essays: the seams show; annoying repetitions occur regu-
larly, and it would have benefitted from a much more thorough 
rewriting. 
I. Professor of Philosophy, Auburn University. 
2. Professor of Political Science, Carleton College. 
